Data di Pubblicazione:
2015
Abstract:
A ‘bounded rational’ overlay is constructed for a model of an interaction between two players who speculate on oil and the U.S. dollar, subject
to financial transaction taxes. This model also has two types of operators: a real economic subject (Air) and an investment bank (Bank).
Many investment operators (banks) are also considered. Their behavior equilibrates much more quickly, as they react to the move of Air. In
this sense, Air is an acting external agent (such as with an external magnetic field in a magnetic system), whereas the random component of the
bounded rational behavior of banks is ‘annealed’ (i.e., averaged out before Air makes its next transaction).
Under certain conditions for the model, the equilibrium measure for the bank agents, after Air has played its strategy, is a Gibbs measure from
statistical mechanics, as the interactions between operators are that for a Potential game.
Tipologia CRIS:
14.a.1 Articolo su rivista
Keywords:
Airlines, Bank, Cross-hedging, Currency Markets, Financial Risk, Financial Transaction Taxes, Game Theory, Hedging, Speculation,
Potential Games, Bounded Rationality, Logit Equilibrium, Gibbs Equilibrium, Noisy Directional Learning, Phase Transition, Entropy.
Elenco autori:
Carfi', David; Campbell, Michael
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